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The article explores the Croatian and Montenegrin EU accession path as a 
two-sided disciplining process established through the negotiations. The “suc-
cess” of the EU’s civilising mission in the two countries is determined through 
the feedback/dialogue relationship formed between the EU and the candidate 
country. I analyse two aspects of the accession negotiations: cooperation with 
the ICTY and the rule of law institutions. In Croatia, the domestic elites’ de-
termination to ensure the membership paired up with the EU’s civilising mis-
sion in the Balkans. In Montenegro, the EU membership has not outright re-
presented the mythical return to Europe, hence initially self-civilising was 
not high on the list of the priorities. Moreover, Montenegro was the success 
story of the Balkans and the EU initially did not insist on the institutional de-
velopment. The paper contributes to the wider EU enlargement literature by 
specifically emphasizing the cultural studies framework and by emphasizing 
the importance of the overlooked feedback/dialogue characteristics of the ac-
cession process.
Keywords: Croatia, Montenegro, European Union, Accession Process, Bal-
kans
Introduction
This article explores the EU accession as a disciplining feedback/dialogue in two 
Western Balkan countries, Croatia and Montenegro. The argument is two-fold. 
Firstly, the EU’s subjective assessment of the countries’ institutional quality influ-
ences the depth and scope of the civilizing mission. I use the term civilizing as the 
intention was adaptation of the domestic inferior institutions to those developed for 
the West, Europe proper. The institutions in question were those defining the rule of 
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law as governing principle of the Western superiority over states established on the 
periphery. In the Balkans, which hosted ethnic conflicts on Europe’s borders at the 
end of the 20th century, the civilizing mission also necessitated ensuring peace and 
stability and curbing aggressive nationalism. The institutions on which I focus are 
those guaranteeing prosecution of war crimes and corruption control.
Secondly, the civilizing mission was not only imposed to the accession coun-
tries from the side of the EU. Instead, accession countries aimed to occupy a pre-
ferential position within a negatively perceived identity (of Europe’s other) through 
the process of the EU enlargement. By vigorously reforming institutions perceived 
as inferior, with the aim of separating from their neighbours and becoming a part 
of Europe proper, the countries responded to the EU’s disciplining requirements 
by self-civilising. Civilising from the side of the EU and self-civilizing (based on 
nesting orientalism; Bakić-Hayden, 1995) from the side of the accession countries 
formed a disciplining feedback/dialogue which will be the focus of the article. The 
disciplining process mostly has feedback characteristics as the accession countries 
respond to the civilising mission of the EU, but occasionally the EU or the candi-
date re-evaluate their position, creating a civilising dialogue. Therefore the disci-
plining process has characteristics of both a dialogue and a feedback. The article 
builds on the EU accession and conditionality effectiveness literature, but takes a 
critical approach through the post-colonial theoretical framework.
Argument and the Aim of the Article
From the perspective of the EU’s side of the disciplining feedback/dialogue, I focus 
on these two aspects: first, how has the EU’s assessment of the institutional quality 
and fulfilment of criteria had a connotation of a “civilizing” mission, and second, 
how Croatia and Montenegro’s designation of being a part of the Balkans informed 
the EU’s approach in the negotiations as compared to the previous rounds of the 
enlargements.
From the perspective of the accession countries, the research focuses on how 
accession countries’ nesting orientalism (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) defines self-civiliz-
ing. In the case of this article, I adopt the term “nesting orientalism” to analyse the 
accession countries’ attempt to escape from the periphery and the backward nega-
tive entity by pushing the border of the periphery to those who are less advanced 
in pursuit of the EU membership. How important is it to push the periphery away 
and how the EU accession defines country against its neighbours determine the 
self-civilizing of the EU accession process. I use the term self-civilising as a pro-
cess in which countries attempt to define themselves as a part of Europe, volunta-
rily and without critical reflection accepting what is imposed as dominant, superior 
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and advanced without military or political domination, by attempting to further its 
progress in the EU enlargement.
Why are the prosecution of war crimes and corruption control suggested as ele-
ments of the civilizing mission? The Balkans was already perceived as unknown, a 
dark side of the (European) “self” (Todorova, 1996), and recent Yugoslav secession 
wars added to this perception. The fear that conflicts might spread from Yugoslavia 
to the ter ritories of the EU and the realization that efficient foreign and security po-
licy was needed, pushed the EU into closer political integration.1 Aggressive con-
flict in the immediate neighbourhood served as a strong incentive to add deeper 
political connections to the existing economic alliance. “Barbaric savagery” (To-
dorova, 1997: 6) in Yugoslavia enabled the birth of the European Union as it provid-
ed a clear differentiation between “us” and “them”, as well as a strong unification 
incentive. Morley and Robinson suggest: The demonization of the enemy and the 
accusations against the Evil Other for their criminality and bestiality were related 
to the desire to purify our own culture and civilisation. To see the Evil Other as the 
embodiment of irrationality was to be certain of our own rational cause and mo-
tives (Morley & Robins, 2002: 136). The violent birth of the independent countries 
enforced the stigma attributed to the savage Balkan region, while the self-image of 
civilization and superiority supported the Balkans status of Europe’s lowest ranked 
periphery (Luketić, 2008).
Ethnic conflicts and use of violence in the Balkans were at the foundation of 
the EU’s self-image of superiority. Dealing with the crimes of war was the initial 
step in the EU’s civilizing mission. Western Balkan countries needed to convince 
the EU that their institutions were capable of dealing with the past in a just man-
ner, while the EU simultaneously used the disciplining feedback/dialogue to ensure 
peace in the region.
Corruption control as the second institutional requirement assessed in this ar-
ticle represents one of the cornerstones of the political requirements formulated in 
the Copenhagen criteria and has been an important aspect of both Southern and 
Eastern enlargements. For the countries of the Southern enlargements, institution 
building aimed at corruption control was incentivised through the use of the EU 
funds. However, the system has proven as inefficient; hence the EU set institutions 
capable of keeping corruption at bay as a condition for membership in the Eastern 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007.
1 In the period of Yugoslav wars, political ties between the members of the European Commu-
nity intensified. The Treaty of the European Union was signed in 1992 and the European Com-
munity officially became the European Union. It also set the rules for Euro as a single currency, 
common foreign and security policy, and improved cooperation in home and justice affairs.
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The fight against corruption is a suitable choice for researching the disciplining 
process due to the following six reasons. Firstly, corruption represents a common 
political criterion for all the accession countries, unlike various political issues such 
as citizens’ rights or border disputes. Therefore, it is possible to assess how the fight 
against corruption was treated in different waves of the EU enlargement. Secondly, 
corruption is seen as a sign of underdevelopment, an antonym of the Western con-
cept of rule of law, and is as such at the core of the civilization mission.2
Thirdly, it is therefore interesting that corruption among high level political 
elites remains particularly ingrained in some of the “old” member states such as Ita-
ly, Portugal, Spain and Greece, but also in new members lauded for corruption con-
trol success such as Slovenia (European Commission, 2014: 6). Differences within 
the “old guard” exist and some countries are assessed to have more problems than 
others. However, older members such as Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom have all 
regressed in corruption control scores between 1996 and 2013 (see Figure 1), sug-
gesting the EU’s transformative potential is, to say the least, doubtful; 79% of EU28 
Europeans agree corruption exists in their national institutions and blame politi-
cians and officials in charge of awarding public tenders for problematic political 
corruption (ibid.: 7).
Fourthly, although political corruption is an issue in the member states, the 
EU fails to deal with it internally. Shallow discussion among the EU members and 
numerous amendments to the anti-corruption network, as a tool to deal with the 
corruption systematically on the EU level, imply a lack of political will and reluc-
2 In this context, the term “old” member states refers to all of the countries which became EU 
members before the Eastern enlargement of 2004.
Fig ure 1. Corruption Control Scores across “Old”2 Member States, 
2.5 as the Best Possible Score (World Bank, 2015)
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tance for more serious action (European Commission, 2014). Addressing corrup-
tion within the EU remains narrow and lags behind international developments, as 
the action in corruption prevention and the monitoring framework remain ineffec-
tive (Szarek-Mason, 2010: 266-268). The EU presumes the role of institution build-
er in the candidate countries, while it has yet to fully master the art itself.
Fifthly, the fight against corruption offers a space for subjective interpretation 
as success does not depend solely on the adoption of laws and regulations. In the 
absence of ironclad indicators it is entirely up to the Commission’s judgement to 
assess whether suitable institutions are in place. Even high level arrests can be sub-
jectively assessed, as the definition of who qualifies as a high level official consi-
derably varies in different contexts. As corruption control is often the last criterion 
the EU insists on before awarding the membership, considerable space for subjec-
tivity and even manipulation leaves open the possibility of the accession disciplin-
ing process.
Sixthly, building anti-corruption institutions ought to be de facto a self-sacri-
fice in the countries where high level political elites are involved in graft. Building 
institutions to deal with corruption represents self-civilising, either through conces-
sions or theatrics. In the article I use the term concessions and theatrics in the fol-
lowing manner. Concessions factually allow effective prosecution and independent 
judiciary. Theatrics aim to convince the EU of self-civilising through adoption of 
various action plans, establishment of anti-corruption agencies and even trials and 
sentences to “sacrificed” middle level elites, but the top of the ruling class remains 
beyond questionability. Frequently the two intertwine as parts of a broader strategy. 
In the following section I explain why Croatia and Montenegro were selected as 
case studies.
Why Croatia and Montenegro?
We analyse Croatia and Montenegro as the most advanced in terms of the EU acces-
sion process in the Western Balkans; Croatia being the first of all Western Balkan 
countries to enter the EU (in 2013), and Montenegro as the leader of the current EU 
accession class.
For Croatia, becoming an EU member represented a key strategy to escape 
from the Balkans as the European periphery, and to push the imaginary European 
border further away towards the ex-Yugoslav countries which have not progressed 
as much in the EU talks. The nesting orientalism (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) through 
the enlargement process was of extreme importance in Croatia to show to the West 
and to itself that Croatia is ready to “graduate” (Kuus, 2004) from being part of the 
backward, violent and chaotic Europe’s inner other (Todorova, 1996) and become 
part of Europe proper.
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The nesting orientalism accompanied Croatian escape from Yugoslavia and 
continued to be projected throughout the accession. However, nesting orientalism 
was also imbued by nationalism and followed by ethnic conflicts, which strongly 
influenced the EU’s perception of Croatia and its disciplining process. Such EU’s 
attitude and Croatian desperation to join the EU led to an “all in” strategy which in-
cluded concessions in the sense of real reforms and theatrics in the sense of efforts 
amounting to little more than window dressing.
Montenegro gained independence by formally rejecting extreme nationalism, 
through a democratic referendum and peaceful establishment of a new state. In ex-
change, Montenegro skipped the civilizing mission element of the war crimes pro-
secution, had to work considerably less to convince the EU of its reforms and to 
gain its status of accession pack leader. Success in the negotiations, lack of effec-
tive political opposition and a milder form of nesting orientalism led to a decreased 
readiness to apply the “all in” strategy to win the EU membership.
Montenegro initially relied on a strategy already identified in Croatia; adoption 
of various regulations, action plans and prosecution of middle level corruption ca-
ses designed to convince the EU that the reforms were taking place while prosecu-
tion and indictments of high level corruption remained conspicuously absent. The 
Delegation of the European Commission in Montenegro signalized that real results 
in the anti-corruption fight were still missing and threatened with a halt in the talks. 
As a result, Montenegro began to sing a new tune and the leadership decided to pre-
pare their own Sanader.3
The two countries became the best among the EU accession group of the West-
ern Balkans through different, yet slowly converging disciplining processes. The 
difference is a result of the EU’s assessment of the required depth and scope of the 
civilising mission on the one hand, and the countries’ nesting orientalism and self-
civilising on the other. The following section provides a brief overview of the exist-
ing studies and introduces personal background incentivising the research.
Conditionality Effectiveness Literature Meets Post-colonial Framework
Considering how much has been written on the topic of the EU enlargement, it is 
surprising how components of the disciplining process received little attention. In 
this section I outline the conditionality effectiveness and post-colonial framework 
on the basis of which I build the argument and show how I aim to contribute to the 
literature. The literature on the EU enlargement has strongly developed the condi-
3 A reference to the process of prosecution and judicial cases against Croatian former prime 
minister Ivo Sanader, quoted from an article in Monitor titled “Marović arrested: Đukanović’s 
Sanader” (Radulović, 2015)
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tionality effectiveness framework, but to understand the disciplining feedback/dia-
logue relationship based on the EU requirements and candidate country’s response, 
a critical post-colonial approach provides a better framework.
Within conditionality effectiveness literature, the focus of the analysis was 
placed on the credible prospect of joining the EU, state capacity and compatibi-
lity of the domestic politics agenda with the EU’s requirements (Haughton, 2007; 
Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Schim-
melfennig, 2008). For the Western Balkan countries it was argued that the EU lacks 
power and effectiveness regarding democracy promotion through political condi-
tionality (Freyburg & Richter, 2010). However, this literature does not observe the 
EU’s subjective assessment of the quality of the rule of law institutions and the 
countries’ self-positioning role in the feedback/dialogue.
After the accession of the CEE (Central and Eastern European countries: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Baltic countries (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) was finalized, the Western Balkans started to receive more 
attention. As the cornerstone of the Copenhagen accession criteria, building institu-
tions for democratic governance was strongly emphasized in the Europeanization 
literature. In particular, research on the Croatian case largely focused on the coope-
ration with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 
and corruption control.
Research dealt with the gap between corruption perception, prosecution and 
political will to convince the EU of the efforts made in controlling the corruption 
(Budak, 2006). Six elements were outlined as having a particularly important ef-
fect on the level and type of corruption in Croatia: first, legacy of the socialist 
self-management; second, war, illegal arms trading and subsequent tycoonisation 
among war veterans; third, non-transparent privatisation; fourth, creation of a state 
apparatus that was beyond questionability; fifth, hyper-bureaucratisation based on 
political loyalty; sixth, hyper-normativism, albeit main legal acts regulating and 
punishing corruption were lacking (Grubiša, 2011). Although the achievements in 
corruption fight and reasons behind lack of progress were well-defined, corruption 
control was perceived as purely imposed by the EU and the strategic component of 
the Croatian response was not fully evaluated.
In terms of war crimes prosecution, three models of compliance with the ICTY 
have been researched: coercion, self-interest and norms (Lamont, 2010b). Croatian 
cooperation with the ICTY has been analysed largely as an obstacle to the enlarge-
ment (e.g. Roter & Bojinović, 2005), while reasons for linking cooperation with 
the Court to the accession were explained through rationalist and constructivist ap-
proach (Mäki, 2008). Zambelli examined the process of adjusting the identity and 
policy discourses, particularly focusing on the cooperation with the ICTY and the 
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changes in the status of Croatia’s Others (Zambelli, 2010). Lamont defined the rela-
tionship of Croatia to the ICTY as strategic compliance (Lamont, 2010a), and Jović 
provided the context for understanding the change in Ivo Sanader’s policy towards 
the ICTY (Jović, 2009).
The Montenegrin path to the EU received far less individual research atten-
tion and the country was largely analysed as a part of the Western Balkans group. 
Corruption in Montenegro received significant attention, but has rarely been ap-
proached from the perspective of the accession conditionality (Bisogno, Reiterer, 
Jandl, Favarin & Davis, 2011; Ipsos Puls, 2010; Ratković, 2009). Civil society, re-
searchers and the EU officials in charge of Montenegrin negotiations agree that the 
fight against corruption remains driven by the accession process (DG Enlargement 
European Commission, 2014; Rajković, 2014; Rudović, 2011), but the type of rela-
tionship with the EU has not been in the focus of research.
War crimes prosecution was not a large obstacle for Montenegrin accession 
and little attention in general has been afforded to the development of full coopera-
tion with the ICTY. In terms of cooperation with the ICTY, most of the research on 
Serbia and Montenegro focused on the Serbian part (McMahon & Forsythe, 2008; 
Spoerria & Freyberg-Inanb, 2008). Besides NGOs and the EU reports which have 
formally commented on the absence of war crimes prosecution, there is a gap in un-
derstanding why the Montenegrin role in the attacks on Dubrovnik was overlooked.
Much effort has been spent so far in understanding the relationship of the EU 
towards the accession countries and vice versa, including analyses of the so-called 
disciplining, tutoring and post-colonial characteristics. Nonetheless, the studies 
have not clearly identified the feedback/dialogue link between the EU’s subjective 
assessment of what is backward and requires the civilizing mission and the acces-
sion countries’ nesting orientalism influencing the depth of the self-civilising mis-
sion. The literature has failed to analyse the shifting feedback/dialogue relationship 
between the EU and the accession countries.
Post-colonial approach to the EU presumes the EU’s display of superiority over 
the accession countries and offers a suitable framework for the analysis of the dis-
ciplining process and the feedback/dialogue it develops between the EU and the ac-
cession country. The literature implies that the candidates were “colonized” through 
acceptance of Western norms of political and economic governance. Post-colonial 
studies argue that the Eastern countries’ centuries-long allegiance to the empires 
of the Great Nations marked them as peripheries to the Western European centre 
of power (Obad, 2008). However, the countries of the CEE and the Baltics can be 
considered as “self-colonizing”, as the values and institutions were adopted with-
out resistance characteristic to an alien invasion, but also with uncritical acceptance 
of the ideology which perceives them as underdeveloped (Kiossev, 1999), where 
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capitalism and Western democracy offer a promise of better life (Boris Buden, as 
quoted in Car, 2013).
The EU’s governance, where the Union is the source of the decision-making 
to which candidate countries need to comply, was described as having clear char-
acteristics of a colonial system (Zielonka, 2006). The position of Eastern European 
countries has been analysed as junior and inferior to Western Europe. Specifically, 
the Europeanization process was perceived as a kind of graduation from Eastern 
Europe to Europe (Kuus, 2004: 477), and “return to Europe” as the feeble Eastern 
Europe making a transition to the West while being coached by the West (ibid.: 476). 
In the process of enlargement, the EU was not exclusively a political and economic 
community, but also a tutor and interpreter of what is considered as civilized and 
advanced (Obad, 2009). On top of the imperial and communist past shared by the 
Balkan, CEE and Baltic countries, recent war conflicts strengthened the connota-
tion of the Balkans as the uncivilized periphery with which the CEE and the Baltic 
countries did not have to deal with. 
However, the literature has not dealt with the differences in the EU’s approach 
to the countries (originating from the subjective assessment of the need for disci-
plining) nor with the depth and the scope of the civilizing mission. Feedback to 
the conditionality (from the side of the accession countries) has been argued to de-
pend on incumbent party orientation (Vachudova, 2008), comparability of domestic 
agenda and required reforms (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004), and the fear of 
being left out from the negotiations (Sigér, 2009).
Nesting orientalism in the context of the enlargement was already suggested as 
the orientalist assumptions about East-Central Europe persist not simply because 
they are imposed on the accession countries but also because they are actively 
used by these countries against their particular Easts (Kuus, 2004: 465). The EU 
enlargement process empowered the previously stigmatized CEE and Baltic coun-
tries into perpetuators motivated to define themselves as European, while attribut-
ing the title of the other away from themselves towards their perspective peripheries 
(Lleshaj, 2013: 6). However, the role of the nesting orientalism was not analysed in 
relation to self-civilizing as a response to the accession requirements, nor was self-
civilizing considered in the context of the enlargement process.4
The existing literature established a framework for post-colonial approach to 
the EU accession process, where candidate countries used progress in the talks to de-
lineate themselves from the periphery and in parallel accept the EU’s criteria which 
4 The self-colonization, as Kiossev’s term in the literature, was applied to the period up until the 
beginning of the 20th century, and its application is not considered suitable for the framework to 
the EU enlargement.
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were difficult issues on the domestic political agenda. The article builds on the ex-
isting literature by analysing the disciplining character of the EU accession. The dis-
ciplining feedback/dialogue was formulated by the EU’s assessment of the need for 
disciplining and accession countries’ nesting orientalism and self-civilizing.
As a citizen of Croatia my perception of the accession process was influenced 
by growing up along the EU talks. During my studies in Zagreb, EU accession was 
frequently portrayed in the media and by the political actors as a civilizing mission, 
while the EU become Croatian tutor and superior entity presuming the right to pet, 
scold and blackmail the small Balkan states. Simultaneously, the EU represented a 
better place for life and career to which Croatia as a country desired to transition. 
The transition from periphery to Europe proper and to the prosperity was possible 
as Croatia perceived itself as better than its Balkan neighbours. The belief that Cro-
atia ought to be able to separate itself from its violent, nationalistic Balkan neigh-
bours and become a member of the EU, when countries such as Hungary, Romania 
or Bulgaria managed to do so, was deeply ingrained in Croatia. Coming from this 
background, I attempt to deal in an objective manner with the stereotypes imposed 
in the literature by the Western scholars which has largely approached the Balkans 
from the superior point of view (Luketić, 2008).
The following section outlines the steps of the Croatian path towards the EU 
and the disciplining feedback/dialogue created through the EU’s relationship to-
wards Croatia and Croatian response to the war crimes prosecution and corruption 
control criteria.
Croatia – One Way Ticket from the Balkans, as Much as it Costs
The section analyses civilizing aspects of the EU’s mission in Croatian accession, 
and it is divided in three time periods: early years of independence under HDZ5 
(1991-2000), Social-democratic coalition governance (2000-2003), and the return 
of HDZ for a double mandate (2003-2011). I research EU’s assessment of the insti-
tutional quality and subsequent accession criteria as a part of a disciplining process. 
From the Croatian side I analyse how nesting orientalism influenced self-civilising 
through the three phases.
Early Years of Independence and Retrospective Europeanization
The first phase (1991-2000) is largely characterized by the lack of interest from the 
Croatian side to participate in the self-civilising process. The EU enlargement, as 
a goal through which a better position within the European hierarchy could be en-
sured, has not yet became a focal point of Croatian nesting orientalism.
5 Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica).
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Croatia became independent in 1992 and dedicated the following decade to 
ensure territorial sovereignty and strengthen national identity. During this period 
Croatian elites wanted to break free from Yugoslavia and, by claiming European 
identity, assume a superior position among its neighbours. Nesting orientalism was 
accompanied by a rise in nationalism, armed conflict, development of crony capital-
ism and authoritarianism. On the one hand, the EU perceived Croatia as a country 
ridden with nationalism and bad quality institutions which were incompatible with 
the EU’s superior self-image. On the other hand, Croatian elites around the first 
Croatian president Franjo Tuđman saw no need to adapt to the evolving European 
Union. By becoming independent from Yugoslavia, Croatia already reaffirmed Eu-
ropean identity6 and ensured its “return to Europe.”
Croatia claimed European identity on the basis of the early acceptance of Chris-
tianity, orientation to the Catholic Church upon the East-West Schism and inclusion 
of the Croatian territories in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which differentiated it 
from its Eastern ex-Yugoslav neighbours. Fight against the Ottoman Empire and 
status of the “Antemurale Christianitatis”7 (the Bulwark of Christianity) had an im-
portant role in the creation of Croatian European identity.8
Tuđman and his political supporters were sceptical about the European Union 
and the process of enlargement which was incompatible with blooming Croatian 
nationalism (Jović, 2011: 11). National sovereignty was placed above the declared 
importance of joining the European Union; hence the EU’s influence over the do-
mestic policy was insignificant. Breaking the Yugoslav chains and the identifica-
tion with traditional cultural and political heritage of Europe, common history and 
6 Tuđman’s speeches in 1990 upon formation of the Croatian Parliament and in 1995 upon gain-
ing membership in the Council of Europe are examples in which he emphasized the claim of cen-
turies-long belonging to Mitteleuropa and Mediterranean Europe which could not by any means 
be undermined by several decades of the political connection with the Balkans (Tuđman, 1996).
7 Southern Croatian aristocracy sent a letter in 1494 to the Pope Alexander 6th and to the Em-
peror Maximilian 1st in which help against Ottoman invaders was sought by referring to Croatia 
as the Bulwark of Christianity. The same expression was later used by the pope Leo 10th in 1519 
when referring to Croatian lands in defence against Ottomans. However, as quoted in Oršolić 
(2013), Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža said: That we are “Antemurale Christianitatis”, was 
not said only to us, but to all Catholic national miseries on Danube and Vistula, which perished 
on the bloody outpost of European interests, while the centre of civilization caroused (Oršolić, 
2013).
8 According to Oršolić, the myth in its various versions was re-developed through the centuries 
by important Croatian politicians such as “the Father of the Homeland”, Ante Starčević, Catholic 
Church, but also by members of the Croatian fascist puppet regime during WWII. Communism 
suppressed the myth, but it was revived with the conflicts in 1990 and 1991. The self-appointed 
position of a bulwark between civilized West and barbaric East became even stronger, but also 
gained a dimension of polarisation between democracy and communism (Oršolić, 2013).
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Christianity (Grubiša, 2005: 133-134) ensured the “return to Europe”. The enlarge-
ment process was not perceived as an entry ticket to Europe proper, or as an addi-
tional measure of separation from the Balkans, therefore the self-civilizing (in terms 
of uncritically accepting superiority of the EU’s institutions) could not begin.
Bandwagoning and the Enlargement-Driven Nesting Orientalism 
Change of leadership and increased lag between Croatia and the CEE and Baltic 
states in the period of 2000-2003 led to an increase in willingness to engage in the 
self-civilising. In December 1999 Franjo Tuđman died and his death led to changes 
in Croatia which would impact the disciplining feedback/dialogue of the EU ac-
cession. The parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 brought democratic 
changes in the political system and political leadership.
As CEE and Baltic countries progressed in negotiations, and Croatia was 
left behind, the EU enlargement was perceived as a path to Europe proper and 
peripheral status was assigned to those left behind. Croatia saw itself as superior 
to its Western Balkans neighbours and as at least an equal of the CEE and Baltic 
countries. Nesting orientalism became defined by the EU enlargement and led to 
a self-civilizing through Europeanization characterized by penetration of the Euro-
pean system of governance in domestic institutions, actors, values and processes 
(Grubiša, 2005: 133-134). Ivica Račan’s left centre coalition which took control 
over the government and parliament in the 2000 elections (2000-2003), was aware 
of Croatian laggard position in the accession process and was willing to initiate ne-
cessary reforms to reduce the gap.
The cooperation with the ICTY (or The Hague Tribunal) was the largest chal-
lenge for Račan’s cabinet. His government was reluctant, due to the fragility of the 
parliamentary coalition9 and possible status of traitors in still nationalistic Croatia,10 
to comply with the arrest and surrender requests for Croatian war commanders. For 
the EU, Račan’s hesitance implied dominance of nationalism over impartiality of 
Western favoured institutions and resulted in the decision to apply a deeper civilis-
ing mission in Croatia. Although most of the EU countries initially opposed tying 
the cooperation with the ICTY with the negotiation process, Croatian continuous 
9 Both HSLS, Croatian Social Liberal Party (Hrvatska socialno-liberalna stranka), and HSS, 
Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka), two parties in Račan’s coalition government, 
suggested non-compliance with the arrest and surrender requests for generals Ante Gotovina and 
Rahim Ademi. When Račan confirmed a commitment of cooperation with the ICTY, HSLS exi-
ted the government.
10 Croatian war veterans organized in 2001 and 2002 numerous protests supporting the indicted 
generals. The largest protest was held in Split and encompassed 100,000 people.
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failure to cooperate with the Tribunal11 or to engage in the norm affirming rhetoric12 
resulted in a deeper civilising mission.
Fight against corruption as the second focus of the EU’s civilising mission was 
initiated during Račan’s government. In 2002 the first Anti-Corruption Action Pro-
gramme was adopted by Račan’s government which also founded the Bureau for 
Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK)13. Overall improvements 
in the quality of governance led also to increase in ranking in control of corruption 
(World Bank, 2015), but for the next half a decade USKOK was not fully functional 
nor was the adopted Action Programme fulfilled. Račan’s government had a chance 
to deal with corruption as it was not the primary beneficiary of speculations in the 
first decade of the statehood, but had not lasted long enough to convince the EU 
that its institutions are on a sufficiently high level. Despite ensuring a better ranking 
than Bulgaria and Romania since the beginning of the 2000s (see Figure 2), political 
corruption remained an issue in Croatian disciplining process, while Bulgaria and 
Romania ensured the membership in 2007.
Račan’s government attempted to bring Croatia closer to the EU, but was very 
careful with the progress of extraditions of war heroes, trying not to tarnish the coa-
lition’s reputation in front of the electorate. Not knowing how lenient the EU would 
11 Račan’s government passed the decision to cooperate with the ICTY, but evaded cooperation 
in terms of accepting the indictment of general Janko Bobetko.
12 Lamont argued that most of the EU members did not want to press Croatia on the issue of the 
cooperation with the Tribunal, but would be satisfied if Račan accepted the competency of the 
ICTY and received the indictments (Lamont, 2010b: 54).
13 Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminala.
Figure 2. Control of Corruption Scores across Western Balkans, CEE 
and the Baltics (World Development Indicators, 2014)
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be, the coalition government attempted to progress with the EU talks without fulfil-
ling the sensitive political conditionality.
From the EU’s perspective, in this period we can identify new elements of the 
EU’s civilizing mission. Secession wars divided the Western Balkan countries from 
their post-socialist CEE and Baltic counterparts that had a less bumpy road to Eu-
rope. Based on this division the EU devised a specific set of rules for the accession 
talks which were more rigorous than in the case of previous enlargement rounds. 
Specifically, in the previous rounds of accession, the EU has not required coopera-
tion with external institutions as a criterion to be fulfilled before the beginning of 
the negotiations. War crimes prosecution showed that the EU’s mission had civi-
lizing elements as the domestic prosecution and judiciary institutions were subjec-
tively assessed as insufficiently developed for the negotiations even to be opened.
Corruption control in this phase led to initial success in building necessary in-
stitutions. Although the self-civilising process included concessions rather than the-
atrics, the progress was deemed insufficient by the EU. As Bulgaria and Romania 
achieved much less and ensured the membership faster, the treatment of Croatia is 
identified as part of the civilising mission. In this phase enlargement became part of 
the nesting orientalism and Croatia began to form the strategy of concessions plus 
theatrics, particularly in terms of cooperation with the ICTY. The EU’s adoption of 
a stricter civilising mission pushed Croatia in the next phase to adopt self-civilising 
reforms and to offer more concessions.
All In Strategy – Moving All Chips in the Pot
In the period 2003-2011 the EU continued the civilising mission of the same depth. 
However, Croatia was fully focused on escaping the Balkans through the EU enlarge-
ment process, and political elites adopted self-civilising measures and contributed to 
the disciplining feedback/dialogue process. The strategy of self-civilising included 
concessions in the cases where the other element, theatrics, was not successful.
Parliamentary elections in 2003 brought reformed HDZ under the leadership 
of Ivo Sanader back to power. HDZ ensured two mandates during which accession 
to the EU remained the main goal of the Croatian foreign policy. The nesting orien-
talism of the enlargement process and the subsequent self-civilizing strengthened 
between 2003 and 2011. Prolonged stay in Europe’s antechamber incentivised the 
elites to invest all in on the EU membership for the fear Croatia will have to wait 
for its Western Balkans neighbours to become a member. As it was self-evident that 
Croatia could not catch up with the historical enlargement of 2004, the goal moved 
towards the Bulgarian and Romanian accession in 2007.
From the side of the Union, as democracy in Croatia was consolidated when 
reformed HDZ took control in 2003, there was little fear that Croatia would take 
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a turn towards autocracy and destabilize the region. However, the aggressive na-
tionalism still needed to be dealt with and ensuring prosecution of the war crimes 
through cooperation with the ICTY was the tool the EU used to civilise Croatia. 
Despite improvements during Račan’s government, corruption remained a worry-
ing factor from the perspective of the EU’s superior institutions.
The government of Ivo Sanader (2003-2007) had a much stronger majority 
in the parliament than the coalition government of Ivica Račan. Despite the obvi-
ous mismatch between its rhetoric and the EU’s political criteria, HDZ’s govern-
ment offered concessions and obediently cooperated with the ICTY and managed 
to spin off the cooperation in extraditing military commanders without compromis-
ing its reputation with the electorate.14 In its attempt to ensure fast beginning of the 
negotiations HDZ ensured delivery of generals Mladen Markač and Ivan Čermak 
to the ICTY. This was assessed as insufficient as the EU, after Račan’s attempts to 
evade cooperation, was determined to force full cooperation with the ICTY. After 
the official negotiations were deferred, Sanader’s government cooperated with the 
foreign intelligence agencies and provided key information that led to the arrest of 
general Ante Gotovina, a symbol of unjust prosecution of the military operation 
that regained control over Croatian territory. However, an even starker example of 
self-civilizing was the anti-corruption fight. Unlike the cooperation with the ICTY, 
which HDZ pulled off without jeopardizing its domination, concessions in the fight 
against corruption required reforms that would be costly for HDZ.
During Sanader’s reign, progress in corruption control was achieved in three 
main phases. Firstly, stricter and better defined legislation in the areas of electoral 
campaign and party funding, undue influence, conflict of interest and supervision 
of state owned companies was adopted. Secondly, USKOK received more funding, 
hired more personnel and improved its capacities. Thirdly, in 2005 a new head of 
USKOK, Dinko Cvitan, was appointed. Cvitan was considered an independent and 
unbiased professional who ensured functionality of the prosecution unit by hiring 
prosecutors with specific competencies and proved the ability to withstand pres-
sures of the fight against corruption (Kuris, 2012).
Increased financial autonomy of USKOK, improved staff capacities in as-
set-tracing and surveillance methods, and institutionalized cooperation between 
USKOK, police and court operations snowballed into visible results, such as success 
14 The government pursued the EU agenda through cooperation with the ICTY but attempted to 
justify sensitive concessions by reminding that Croatian Parliament under majority of the coali-
tion government approved in 2000 the ICTY’s authority over military actions Flash and Storm, 
as well as suggesting that their cooperation with the ICTY is consistent with HDZ’s effort to de-
fend the Croatian role in the conflict. Moreover, HDZ had close ties with the associations of war 
veterans which prevented public protests (Lamont, 2010b: 47).
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in actions Maestro and Index (ibid.). Despite the success in these actions, ruling 
elites were still above questioning and the EU remained unconvinced that Croatia 
managed to build institutions of sufficient quality.
Surprise resignation of the Prime Minister Sanader in July 2009 remained un-
explained, but his prosecution and criminal charges for corruption offered some 
evidence of the results of Croatian self-civilizing mission. Secondary sources sug-
gested that years of data collection and Sanader’s leave from the position of the 
prime minister enabled USKOK to indict him and other members of the ruling party 
and his cabinet for corruption and undue influence in several affairs such as sales of 
state owned oil company and party funding.
The EU’s civilizing and Croatian self-civilizing mission provide an explana-
tion how the most powerful person in Croatia was indicted. Vladimir Šeks, one of 
the most prominent members of HDZ, said that Ivo Sanader tried to sack the state 
attorney before his arrest. However, at that point his successor Jadranka Kosor and 
HDZ’s membership behind her were pressured to stay aside as the investigations 
became an unstoppable process (as quoted in Kuris, 2012). As Austria and other 
regional countries had evidence of Sanader’s graft activities beyond Croatian bor-
ders, Sanader and the party membership behind him were sacrificed to convince 
the EU of the quality of Croatian institutions. Although Sanader’s arrest and trials 
comprised both elements of theatrics and concessions, it persuaded the EU that im-
punity was not ensured even for the highest officials and that good quality institu-
tions were built in Croatia.
However, why was the EU’s conditionality regarding anti-corruption so effec-
tive that political elites neglected the threat it posed to their own political survival? 
As Croatian leadership uniformly supported the EU membership, a feedback effect 
has strengthened the EU’s pressure on fight against corruption applied through ne-
gotiations. Since its foundation in 1992 Croatia claimed to belong to Europe based 
on its cultural and religious identity. Escaping from the Balkan periphery and be-
coming part of the EU proper were the most important goals, strongly determining 
domestic and foreign affairs. For Croatia, the enlargement process provided a pos-
sibility to separate itself from the negativity of the Balkans, the connotation of vio-
lence, but also to take a better place in the European hierarchy.
Therefore, political elites were determined to ensure membership in the EU 
as fast as possible by committing to the reforms which brought easily measura-
ble results. The urgency of becoming part of the EU and separating itself formally 
from the Western Balkans was also incentivised by the perceived exclusion after 
the historic enlargement in 2004 and the laggards’ accession in 2007. Croatia was 
excluded from this historic moment, but also the gap between Croatia and the CEE 
and Balkan neighbours was widening. These two factors pushed Croatian elites to 
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engage in concessions which would otherwise be considered too dangerous for po-
litical survival. The following section analyses Montenegrin accession and feed-
back/dialogue relationship.
Montenegro: Conceding to All, but Doing It Our Way
Montenegrin position of leader of the Western Balkans accession class was a pro-
duct of the EU’s positive (albeit subjective) assessment of nationalism rejection, 
newly developed self-awareness and the resulting wish to leave the Balkans behind. 
War crimes have not represented a problem for the Montenegrin state in the nego-
tiations as Montenegro openly abandoned Serbian aggressive nationalism; before 
becoming an independent state, the authorities cooperated with the ICTY, extradit-
ed two of its citizens and initiated reconciliation with its neighbours and between 
its citizens’ different ethnicities. In the region where radical nationalism was wide-
spread and posed a serious threat to political stability despite years of international 
interventions, the EU assessed this was enough and has not pressed further the issue 
of cooperation with the ICTY. Moreover, the EU was ready to overlook rampant po-
litical corruption to ensure alliance with Montenegrin elites which promoted peace-
ful coexistence in the still violent Balkans. 
Paralleling the Croatian chapter, I apply the same structure in analysing the 
feedback/dialogue relationship between the EU and Montenegro during the acces-
sion talks. From the side of the EU, I focus on the subjectivity of the EU assessment 
of the institution-building progress and on the civilizing elements of the negotia-
tions in the areas of war crimes prosecution and corruption control. From the Mon-
tenegrin side of the feedback/dialogue process, I research nesting orientalism and 
how it influenced Montenegrin response to the EU disciplining.
The Art of Choosing the Winning Side
Montenegro was the only country among fellow Yugoslav successor states where in-
cumbent communist party won and maintained power throughout the whole transi-
tion period. On the tide of the protests for economic improvements at the end of the 
1980s, new leaders of the communist party, Momir Bulatović, Svetozar Marović and 
Milo Đukanović, effortlessly won the first democratic elections. DPS,15 as the suc-
cessor of the communist party, was founded two months before the first elections, 
but the party officially changed its name half a year after the electoral victory. As 
one of the poorer Yugoslav republics that greatly benefited from Yugoslav common 
budget, Montenegro also from the economic perspective had limited motivation to 
renege on Yugoslav identity. Unlike in Croatia, where the “return to Europe” meant 
15 Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista).
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parting ways with Yugoslavia, in Montenegro Europe was in this phase still not iden-
tified as a desirable goal. Political leadership headed by Momir Bulatović initially 
endorsed a union and close relations with Serbia under the leadership of Slobodan 
Milošević. Montenegro used the nationalist rhetoric of “Let’s attack before they at-
tack us”16 and asserted its own territorial claims over the south of Croatia.
A new tide was coming when Milo Đukanović won DPS party elections and 
took control over the party in 1997. His policy was oriented towards distancing 
Montenegro from Milošević, while Bulatović advocated unity with Serbia. Hybrid 
regime literature argued that transition to democracy occurred as DPS split in two 
factions, led by Đukanović and Bulatović respectively, who fought in the subse-
quent presidential elections (Vuković, 2014). Đukanović won the elections and dis-
tanced Montenegro from the radical nationalist politics of Slobodan Milošević. The 
choice earned him a strong support from the West; nearing Montenegro to the West-
ern liberal democracies also meant weakening Serbian aggressive nationalism. To 
that end the international community strongly rooted for Đukanović.17
In 2000 Milo Đukanović, as president of Montenegro, formally apologized 
to Croatian president Stipe Mesić for the pain and material damage inflicted by 
the Montenegrin citizens during the war, especially emphasizing the attack on Du-
brovnik. His politics of estrangement from Serbia, proven through electoral duels 
with Bulatović, and opening of the borders to Serbian dissidents and Kosovo refu-
gees at the end of the 1990s established his role of a Balkan politician whom the 
West would prefer over the advocates of aggressive nationalism.
In the years to come, DPS and its leader Milo Đukanović had a significant role in 
facilitating the referendum for independence in 2006, in which a narrow majority of 
55.5% (55% being the EU mandated threshold) voted in favour of Montenegrin inde-
pendent state. Parting of the ways for Serbia and Montenegro cemented Đukanović’s 
position as one of the favourite ex-Yugoslav politicians, as the EU interpreted it as 
Montenegrin decision to choose European future without reaching for nationalism 
and violence which followed the creation of the other Western Balkan states.
16 Among Montenegrins, the attack on Dubrovnik was justified as preventive action. False re-
ports announced military preparations of about 30,000 Croatian fascists, ustaše, which suppo-
sedly planned to attack Montenegrin Boka Kotorska bay.
17 In the first round of the presidential elections Bulatović won and was considered a safe win-
ner in the second round of the elections. However, under unclear circumstances Đukanović won 
in the second round with only 5500 votes more. Bulatović initially refused to accept the results 
of the elections. In the aftermath of the elections, violent protests were initiated in the north of 
Montenegro where Bulatović had a strong support and have spread to the capital Podgorica. In 
his memoirs, Bulatović claimed to have conceded to acknowledge the results of the elections due 
to pressures of the foreign diplomats, which advocated Đukanović as the candidate who would 
weaken Serbian influence on the Balkans (Bulatović, 2004).
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The EU’s desperation for good news in the region helped Montenegrin trans-
formation into a poster child of the Western Balkans. Lack of political issues as ob-
stacles to the accession talks and the elite’s ability to ensure peaceful coexistence 
in a multi-ethnic society sped up the pace of the overall negotiations. From the side 
of the EU, the civilizing mission that Croatia had to face in terms of dealing with 
war crimes was not required in Montenegro. The ICTY issued indictments for two 
Montenegrin military officers and both were apprehended to the Tribunal without 
any public reaction while Montenegro was still a part of the state union with Ser-
bia. While Montenegro participated in bombarding Dubrovnik, prosecution of the 
commanding war crimes was not a condition either for signing the Stabilisation and 
Accession Agreement (SAA)18 or for opening the formal negotiations with the EU. 
So far merely three final judgements on war crimes in Yugoslav wars have been 
brought in Montenegro and none concerned commanding responsibility. EU pro-
gress report for 2014 suggested that no serious efforts to tackle impunity have been 
demonstrated in Montenegro (DG Enlargement European Commission, 2014), but 
cooperation with the ICTY or domestic prosecution of war crimes were not a condi-
tion for progress in negotiations.
Montenegrin appeal as the poster child of the EU negotiations was based on 
political leaderships’ decisions to steer away from Milošević’s politics and gradu-
ally turn to the European future. The EU initially assessed that Montenegro deviated 
sufficiently from Serbian nationalism so as not to require deep disciplining, which 
led to a milder civilising mission. Đukanović’s positioning against the Serbian re-
gime ensured support of the West, but also convinced the international community 
to basically close their eyes to speculations and frauds DPS employed to stay in 
power. Nesting orientalism in Montenegro skipped the phase of Yugoslav chain 
breaking at the beginning of the 1990s which was so decisive for Croatian self-civi-
lizing. After DPS party split in 1997, nesting orientalism developed with the idea 
of independence from Serbia; it was considered that separation from Serbia would 
improve Montenegrin position in the European hierarchy. The idea of leaving the 
Balkans through the EU accession became prominent for the first time in the cam-
paign for the parliamentary elections in 1998 when DPS and SDP19 formed a politi-
cal coalition “European Montenegro”.
Montenegrin accession lacked emphasis on the “return to Europe”, but mem-
bership became a tool for exiting the Balkan periphery and for assuming a better 
18 As a distinctive policy framework developed for the Western Balkan countries, SAA is di-
rectly linked to the EU’s commitment to the Western Balkans membership prospects. The overall 
Stabilisation and Accession Process includes a number of political obligations on human rights, 
democracy, rule of law and full cooperation with the ICTY.
19 The Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (Socijaldemokratska partija Crne Gore).
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hierarchical position among the neighbours. Prime Minister of Montenegro, and 
the leader of DPS, was quoted saying that Montenegro as a leader of the region 
cannot allow itself to continue to roam the Balkan wastelands (Balkans Al jazeera, 
2012). Political elites also readily affirmed Montenegrin willingness to assist less 
advanced countries in their accession efforts (CDM, 2014; Kodex, 2014), already 
assuming a higher position in the European hierarchy and the role of a tutor. This 
change of heart was also paralleled by economic growth and highest per capita 
foreign direct investments in the region. Unlike communist Montenegro which be-
longed to the camp of the poor Yugoslav republics, Montenegrin now saw Serbia as 
an economic weight and compared itself to more prosperous CEE countries.
The combination of different treatment from the side of the EU and different 
perception of the EU enlargement from the side of Montenegro formed an altered 
feedback/dialogue relationship. Lack of pressure from the side of the EU regarding 
the prosecution of war crimes and lack of incentives from the side of Montenegro 
led to a less streamlined civilizing mission in comparison to Croatia. As Montene-
gro started perceiving its path to Europe as a chance to improve its position within 
the region, it became more pliable to the EU’s disciplining mechanisms.
The EU signed SAA with Montenegro in October 2007 and the candidate sta-
tus was approved in December 2010. Although perceived as a relative laggard in the 
race to the EU accession, the absence of sensitive political issues the accession of 
the other countries was laden with (Gotev, 2013), ensured remarkable progress. The 
negotiations began in June 2012. Largest incompatibilities have been outlined in the 
control of corruption, prosecution of crimes, independence of judiciary and envi-
ronmental regulation (DG Enlargement European Commission, 2014). By this time 
Montenegro has eagerly started to adapt its legislation and has initiated the reforms 
primarily in the areas which did not tackle the partitocratic character of the regime.
Montenegrin strategy for the reforms required by the EU has been visible in 
the implementation of suggested cooperation with NGOs. While the government 
enthusiastically ensured places for NGOs in the working groups, real cooperation 
has not materialized except in the cases when such an arrangement suited the go-
vernment (USAID, 2012). Despite proclaimed dedication to liberal democracy, 
freedom of media was consistently contested as journalists working on the cases of 
corruption and organized crime often faced physical threats, attacks and one case 
of murder (Ponoš, 2014).20 Removal of administrative barriers (World Economic 
20 Some of the examples include death of owner and editor-in-chief of the newspapers Dan 
Duško Jovanović in 2004, attack on Vijesti director Željko Ivanović in 2007, bombing of Vijesti 
journalist Tufik Softić’s house and several bomb attacks on Vijesti cars in 2011, attack on Vijesti 
journalist Olivera Lakić during her work on uncovering corruption affairs in 2012, and bomb at-
tack on Vijesti editor Mihailo Jovović’s office in 2013.
Hajdinjak, S., Rocky Road to Europe: Disciplining Croatia and Montenegro...
63
Forum, 2015) outlined its readiness to tackle requirements where progress was easy 
to measure and which did not put ruling political elites in danger.
As Montenegro seemed only too eager to accept EU regulations stipulated in 
the negotiation chapters, the issue of corruption and organized crime remained the 
most often quoted obstacle to the Montenegrin EU accession by the European Com-
mission. Political corruption was considered widespread and the highest political 
and economic elites were enmeshed in the corruption knot (Galbraith Lipton, 2006). 
DPS controlled the political scene in Montenegro and resources were pooled into 
the hands of a group which continuously became stronger and had fewer incentives 
to engage in the fight against corruption which would lead to its demise. 
After the establishment of the independent Montenegrin state, issues concern-
ing Montenegrin nationalism arose, e.g. the use of Montenegrin language as the of-
ficial language of the state broadcaster in 2010 and the introduction of Montenegrin 
language grammar to the schools. Both occasions resulted in criticism of supposed 
promotion of an artificial language. Serbian parties have opposed the adoption of 
the electoral law until a compromise solution was found. The accepted compromise 
was a class taught in schools called “Montenegrin-Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian lan-
guage and literature”. However, according to Vanja Ćalović, head of NGO MANS, 
identity and ethnicity and the issues of the Montenegrin church, language and na-
tional symbolism were used to draw attention from organized crime, corruption and 
misdeeds in the privatization process (Vanja Ćalović as quoted in Morrison, 2009: 
228).21
The EU delegation in Montenegro regularly criticized the government for the 
failure to combat corruption, especially among high level political elites. However, 
the EU has simultaneously ignored reports of organized crime and corruption and 
has not “punished” Montenegro by slowing down or suspending its negotiations. 
At the end of 2013 five new chapters, including chapters 23 and 24 defining the 
EU’s rule of law requirements, have been opened. As a consequence, a mixed mes-
sage was sent to Montenegro that it is possible to progress in the negotiations while 
faking internalization of the fight against crime and corruption. Montenegro has 
21 “The main problems in Montenegro are organized crime and corruption. These issues of eth-
nicity and identity are frequently used to cover real problems, as they have been in the past 
17 years since the introduction of multi-party elections. However, following the referendum 
we thought the government would no longer be able to hide behind these issues. Instead they 
would have to address social issues, dirty privatization, economic issues, corruption and organi-
zed crime. But still they are talking about whether we are Serbs or Montenegrins, about the 
Montenegrin language, the Montenegrin church and so forth. This situation is excellent for the 
government because it means that they do not address the most important problems and are, by 
extension, not responsible for their real decisions. They just become the ‘winners’ who gave us 
an independent Montenegro.” 
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adopted the theatrics strategy identifiable in postponing the selection of the state 
prosecutor for almost a year in 2014 and failing to investigate the “Tape recording” 
affair,22 while simultaneously suggesting an overly ambitious corruption action plan 
(CDM, 2015) and orchestrating corruption prosecution cases aimed to convince the 
EU of introduced reforms. 
The case of corruption connected to the construction of the tourist resort Za-
vala and sales of the land in Košljun hill illustrated the latter. In the Zavala case, 
DPS’ political leadership of Budva municipality ensured privileges to Russian-
Montenegrin23 investors during 2007 by allowing construction in the green, recrea-
tional area with no construction permit, which led to the loss of valuable munici-
pality land and loss of money from the budget (MANS, 2011). Highly positioned 
DPS members, such as former Budva mayor Rajko Kuljača and the vice president 
of the municipality assembly Dragan Marović, brother of Svetozar Marović, were 
apprehended and received several years of prison sentences. In the Košljun case, 
new Budva mayor Lazar Rađenović and two of his accomplices used insider infor-
mation for a land sales deal which led to a loss of more than EUR 10 million to the 
municipal budget.
Critical media and NGOs have attested numerous similar affairs which have not 
received any attention from the state prosecutor (e.g. Milovac & Mrdović, 2012), 
suggesting that “Zavala” and “Košljun” represented two cases in which DPS’ mid-
level political elites were sacrificed to make Montenegrin anti-corruption mission 
believable. MANS and the critical media openly stated that the affairs were han-
dled, controlled and managed from the top of the DPS party (OCCRP/CIN, 2012; 
e.g., SEEbiz, 2011; Vijesti, 2014). Montenegrin chief negotiator with the EU has 
presented the case as a proof that Montenegro was prosecuting high-level political 
corruption. However, the Commission has not accepted the manoeuvre as convin-
cing evidence that high-level corruption is prosecuted, hence further improvements 
were required.
Although Montenegro started using the EU enlargement as a strategy to es-
cape from the Balkans and to obtain a better position among its neighbours, the de-
spair of Croatian “return to Europe” was initially missing. Moreover, in the initial 
22 Media outlet Dan reported the so-called “Tape recording” or “Snimak” affair where record-
ings from DPS inner party meetings suggested the incumbent party was trying to secure jobs for 
party loyalists, close a trade union led by the opposition Democratic Front and buy votes for the 
subsequent elections (Freedom House, 2014)
23 Initially, Montenegrin company Zavala invest, founded by Moninvest, in the co-ownership 
of Svetozar Marović (then vice-president of DPS) was a partner with the Russian Mirax in the 
project. Svetozar Marović withdrew from the company, and the company later sold its share to 
Mirax (MANS, 2011).
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period of the accession process Montenegro was successful in convincing the EU 
of its openness to changes and peaceful co-existence in a multi-ethnic community. 
Therefore, the civilising mission was milder and in return Montenegrin self-civilis-
ing in problematic issues was dominated by theatrics over concessions. Although 
instability in the Western Balkans incentivised the EU to allow Montenegrin sclero-
tic progress, former Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner Štefan 
Füle (2000-2014) linked the progress of the negotiations to the rule of law related 
reforms, potentially indicating the EU was about to put more pressure on Monte-
negrin disciplining. The 2014 Commission report directly requesting real reforms 
suggested that the current theatrics strategy would open the prospect for putting a 
brake on Montenegrin negotiations (Menke, 2014).
Since August 2015, special prosecutor Milivoj Katnić (appointed in June 2015) 
requested the arrest of thirteen individuals (including DPS Budva leadership and 
Svetozar Marović’s daughter and brother) charged with affairs Jaz Plateau and TQ 
Plaza. Special prosecution gave the arrest orders due to reasonable doubts that the 
suspects have abused official positions and executed the crimes in an organized 
manner. The prosecutor has suggested that the suspects were members of a crimi-
nal group with the goal of acquiring illegal power and profit and that the activities 
of the criminal group were planned for the longer time period and through specific 
rules with precisely defined roles and assignments (Đukanović, 2015). Further ar-
rests for the Prijevor land deal have included Svetozar Marović’s son, godfather and 
aunt. Finally, in December 2015 the special prosecutor arrested Svetozar Marović, 
as the head of the organized criminal group suspected for the loss of EUR 10 mil-
lion to the municipal budget (N1info, 2015).
In the affairs Zavala and Košljun only mid-level political elites were arrested 
and suspected for crimes. The case of the so-called organized criminal group Budva 
potentially announced a change as Svetozar Marović, of the leading members of 
DPS, had the reputation of an untouchable. As the case has not yet received its judi-
cial epilogue, it is difficult to draw final conclusions at this moment. However, criti-
cal media have immediately suggested that criminal prosecution of the Budva group 
should not be too surprising. The period in which the EU was willing to ensure a 
privileged position and overlook some of the more “idiosyncratic” characteristics 
of Montenegro’s reform process (Morrison, 2009) came to an end as the EU’s civi-
lizing mission of fighting corruption as the world’s greatest evil must be completed 
before the accession.
Radulović suggested that prosecution of the group around Marović belongs to 
the already seen theatrics strategy aimed at satisfying the EU’s hunger for anti-cor-
ruption results. In a country where NGOs regularly report cases of land use specu-
lation and electoral frauds to the prosecution bodies, supported with an abundance 
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of evidence, it can be seen as symptomatic that three largest cases dealt with Budva 
municipality and Marović’s group. RTCG’s24 journalist Mirko Rašković single-
handedly unearthed for the investigative TV show “Mehanizam: Obećana zemlja”25 
one of the affairs for which Budva organized criminal group is being prosecuted. 
Conveniently, to the EU’s more aggressive disciplining feedback, Montenegro re-
sponded with a case that was already laid out in front of the prosecution. 
In the following section I outline, based on existing CEE, Baltic and Croatian 
experience, what can be expected from the post-accession in terms of corruption 
control.
Quo Vadis: the Post-accession
The post-accession period brought a reversal in the anti-corruption field in most 
of the new EU members (Batory, 2010; Tomini, 2015: 154). Lack of pressure and 
sanction mechanisms for misbehaving political elites led to a rolling back of pro-
gress in the control of corruption. However, if the institutions were not internalized 
and were a result of theatrics, chances of the rolling back of progress increased.
In the case of Croatia, USKOK’s authority and strengthened capacities ac-
quired in the period of the accession talks could provide an obstacle for reversal 
of the achieved progress. The rollback of progress in the anti-corruption area in 
the CEE and the Baltics can be explained by the change in the funding schemes for 
NGOs, the EU’s most important tool for anti-corruption fight in the CEE and the 
Baltic states (Derderyan, 2010). As progress in Croatia relied on the top to bottom 
approach and less on the pressures of NGOs and the media, the chances for rever-
sals could be lower. The recent ruling of the Constitutional court, which returned 
Sanader’s trial to the County court due to the unconstitutional elements of the pre-
vious trial, suggests that the independence of the judiciary still needs to be further 
analysed. The following section describes how the accession process differed in the 
CEE and the Baltic countries in comparison with the Western Balkans.
Disciplining the Western Balkans
Although countries of the Eastern enlargement went through a similar process of 
civilising where the EU has frowned on their inferior institutions and required mul-
tiple concessions before the membership was granted, the overall disciplining pro-
cess for the Western Balkans was wider in scope and deeper in breadth. As a direct 
response to the ethnic conflicts, which further alienated the EU from the Balkans 
24 Radio i Televizija Crne Gore (Radio and Television of Montenegro).
25 “Mechanism: Promised Land”.
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as its wild and barbaric periphery, institutions in the Western Balkan countries were 
not trusted. Before starting the negotiations, the component of war crimes prosecu-
tion and cooperation with the ICTY had to be fulfilled, which broadened the scope 
of the civilising mission in the Western Balkans.
Corruption fight requirement, important across all rounds of the enlargement, 
showed how the EU took a much stricter attitude towards Croatia and the Western 
Balkan countries than towards the countries of the earlier Eastern enlargement such 
as Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, where the EU also perceived corruption 
to be a serious problem (Grubiša, 2011). Although corruption indices suggested cor-
ruption control was on a similar level in the Western Balkans (average) as in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria, while Croatia and Montenegro to an extent had even better scores, 
accession negotiations with the two countries progressed with fewer interruptions 
than with Croatia as the fastest among the Western Balkan group.
Figure 2 (see page 55) showed that already in 2000 Croatia received a better 
score on control of corruption indicators devised by the World Bank than Romania 
and Bulgaria (World Development Indicators, 2014). Moreover, during the entire 
period, but especially at the end of 2003 (end of Račan’s coalition government) 
the indicator suggested control of corruption in Croatia was on a similar level as in 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. Moreover, Bulgaria and 
Romania since the 2007 enlargement receive a score that is remarkably similar to 
the Western Balkan average and Montenegro individually. However, the Western 
Balkan average was significantly lower than the average of the CEE and Baltic 
countries (EU10), explaining why the EU considered a deeper civilising mission 
was required.
While CEE and Baltic countries proved more successful in building new insti-
tutions, the results of Bulgaria and Romania were less impressive. Literature sug-
gested that Romanian and Bulgarian accession was a political decision and that the 
accession carrot did not provide sufficient incentives to root out corruption (Ra-
packi & Próchnia, 2009). It was obvious the two countries were not ready, but the 
EU did not want to renege on the promise after deferring the membership to 2007. 
Moreover, it was considered better to have the two countries under control and the 
best way was to have them in the Union (ibid.). The EU was concerned not to break 
its promise on Bulgarian and Romanian accession date, but had no difficulties post-
poning the start of the EU talks in the Western Balkans. While corruption in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria was on a higher level than in Croatia and on a similar level like in 
the Western Balkans, the EU perceived the Western Balkans as the dark side within 
(Todorova, 1997) and hence as a difficult case where stricter disciplining should be 
applied.
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Tentative Conclusions: Transitioning between Periphery and Europe 
through Disciplining Feedback/Dialogue
The article discussed the disciplining feedback/dialogue between the EU acces-
sion countries Croatia and Montenegro and the EU. We analysed how the EU’s 
subjective assessment of the country’s institutions and accession country’s nesting 
orientalism in terms of corruption control and war crimes prosecution affected the 
disciplining feedback/dialogue relationship. Croatia and Montenegro are the most 
successful Western Balkan countries, but have reached this position through a dif-
ferent disciplining process.
Croatian nesting orientalism, combined with nationalism, led the EU to force a 
tough civilising mission. Croatia, eager to escape the Balkans, saw the EU enlarge-
ment process as a chance to take a better position within the European hierarchy 
and did all it took to convince the EU of its rule of law institutions. The feedback 
included real concessions though the final evidence of Croatian progress, prosecu-
tion of the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, has dubious elements of theatrics.
Montenegrin nesting orientalism occurred upon rejection of Serbian national-
ism at the end of the 1990s. Milo Đukanović’s turn towards the EU and his victory 
over pro-union oriented Bulatović ensured him a privileged treatment and resulted 
in a favourable assessment of the need for a civilising mission in Montenegro.
Mild disciplining and the EU’s willingness to look the other way while DPS 
ensured its domination through controversial means, led to slacking in terms of cor-
ruption control. For a prolonged period self-civilising failed to include areas which 
might jeopardize the ruling elites and included mostly theatrics. However, the EU 
signalized it would halt the negotiations if Montenegro failed to offer concessions 
in self-civilising corruption control. Assessing that progress in accession would not 
be possible without “a large sacrifice on the altar of the anti-corruption fight, an ex-
cellent choice imposed itself” (Radulović, 2015).
The article suggests that the civilising mission in the Western Balkans is wider 
and deeper in comparison to measures applied in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. I 
argue that EU’s assessment of inferior institutions led to a more encompassing dis-
ciplining process, while Western Balkan countries’ desperation to change their posi-
tion within the entity of Europe’s other led Croatia and Montenegro to outstanding 
self-civilizing acts.
The argument advocated in the article is that the EU’s attitude towards Western 
Balkan countries was one of building institutions, as the existing ones were seen as 
unfit for the EU’s civilization standards. Jeremy Pope said that combating corrup-
tion is not an end in itself; it is not a blinkered crusade to right all the wrongs of the 
world. However, in the case of the Western Balkan countries, the approach of the 
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EU was exactly such. The EU approaches its Western Balkans periphery from an 
elevated position (Melegh, 2006) and seeks to reform it by dealing with the barbaric 
savagery of the Yugoslav wars through war crimes prosecution requirement and by 
building good governance through anti-corruption institutions. 
Finally, the article aimed to contribute to the literature by outlining the transi-
tional elements of the EU enlargement as accession countries in the negotiations at-
tempt to leave the spaces of the periphery and stop being Europe’s other, by becom-
ing part of Europe proper. Not only is the accession to the EU a transition process 
for the candidate countries, but also for the European Union, which continuously 
re-builds its identity by accepting new members.
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